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CONTEMPLATING THE ENDGAME: AN EVOLUTIONARY 
MODEL FOR THE HARMONIZATION AND 
CENTRALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES 
REGULATION 
Eric C. Chaffee* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Chess is a game of stages and transitions consisting of an opening, a 
middlegame, and an endgame.  In Last Lectures, former world chess 
champion José Raúl Capablanca writes, “[I]n order to improve your 
game, you must study the endgame before anything else; for, whereas 
the endings can be studied and mastered by themselves, the middlegame 
and the opening must be studied in relation to the endgame.”1  This 
concept can be applied to any transitional process that involves various 
stages.  One must begin by contemplating the desired conclusion, and 
then one must determine the path to that conclusion.  Using this process, 
desired ends are more likely to be achieved, and they are likely to be 
achieved more easily.  Put another way, simply living in the now during 
a transitional process can have negative consequences because one has 
not contemplated desired goals or the best path to achieving them. 
Yet, in the realm of international securities law, many regulators and 
commentators are satisfied with simply living in the now without 
determining what an ideal system of international securities law should 
look like or how such a system of law could be achieved.  Of course 
some regulators and commentators are satisfied with the current system 
of international securities law that has evolved in the past few decades.2  
However, many believe that this model of regulatory competition is 
 *  Associate Professor and Chair of the Project for Law and Business Ethics, University of 
Dayton School of Law; J.D., University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A., The Ohio State University.  
I would like to thank Christine Gall, Esq. for her editorial comments and encouragement while drafting 
this essay.  I would also like to thank Professor Barbara Black and the editorial board of the The 
University of Cincinnati Law Review for inviting me to participate in their symposium and to contribute 
to this symposium issue.  The views set forth in this essay are completely my own and do not necessarily 
reflect the views of any employer or client either past or present. 
 1. JOSÉ RAÚL CAPABLANCA, LAST LECTURES 19 (1966) (providing a world chess champion’s 
views on the game of chess). 
 2. See generally Roberta Romano, The Need for Competition in International Securities 
Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 387 (2001) (arguing for a regulatory competition approach to 
international securities regulation). 
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simply an unfortunate byproduct of the nationalistic and protectionist 
attitudes of many nations, and a reality that cannot be overcome.3 
Although some benefits exist to the regulatory competition that is 
occurring among individual nations attempting to attract issuers, 
investors, and a variety of other market participants, the harms created 
by such a model of international securities law far outweigh those 
benefits.4  This is because patchwork regulation does not work to 
effectively and efficiently regulate securities markets.  This was proven 
in the United States during the 1920s when a patchwork of state law was 
used to regulate the national securities markets.5  This patchwork proved 
ineffective resulting in the stock market crash of 1929 and the Great 
Depression.6  In response to these events, Congress enacted the 
Securities Act of 19337 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.8  
Because of the harmonized and centralized system of national securities 
regulation created by these acts, the United States’ national markets 
enjoyed relative stability for the remainder of the twentieth century. 
The financial crisis that began in 2008 also evidences that patchwork 
regulation is ineffective in regulating securities markets.  In the past few 
decades, global securities markets have begun to emerge, and national 
and regional based systems of securities law have created a patchwork 
of securities regulation on the international level.9  This patchwork of 
regulation has created competition among nations and regions to attract 
issuers, investors, and other market participants.10  In terms of the 
financial crisis that began in 2008, this created a race-to-the-bottom in 
international securities regulation in which no nation wanted to ratchet 
up the level of regulation or enforcement relating to the mortgage-
backed securities that were at the heart of the crisis, fearing that it would 
render their nation or region less competitive.11  Because of this, the 
 3. See Eric J. Pan, Single Stock Futures and Cross-Border Access for U.S. Investors, 14 STAN. 
J.L. BUS. & FIN. 221, 236 (2008) (“Foreign jurisdictions historically have expressed hostility to any 
extension of U.S. trading and liability standards to their markets, and the SEC has expressed skepticism 
about the standards of most prominent foreign exchanges.”). 
 4. See infra Part II.C (explaining the dangers of transitioning to a regulatory competition model 
of international securities regulation). 
 5. See infra Part IV.A (providing an overview of the development of securities regulation in the 
United States). 
 6. See infra Part IV.A. 
 7. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006). 
 8. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006). 
 9. See infra Part II.A (discussing the reasons for the emergence of global securities markets). 
 10. See Chris Brummer, Stock Exchanges and the New Markets for Securities Law, 75 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1435 (2008) (arguing that regulatory competition is the foundation of the emerging model of 
international securities law). 
 11. See Donald C. Langevoort, U.S. Securities Regulation and Global Competition, 3 VA. L. & 
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financial crisis that began in 2008 ensued.12  In addition to similar 
causes, the Great Depression and the financial crisis that began in 2008 
are similar in terms of severity.  Notably, the financial crisis that began 
in 2008 has been referred to as the “most severe financial crisis since the 
Great Depression,”13 the “Great Recession,”14 and even a depression 
itself.15  Put simply, regulatory fragmentation creates a race-to-the-
bottom in any system of securities regulation that generates dire results.  
Although some benefits may exist to regulatory competition, these 
benefits are outweighed by this reality.16 
Ideally, the world should adopt an approach to international securities 
regulation that is similar to the approach used by the United States in 
response to the stock market crash of 1929 and the ensuing Great 
Depression.  The securities laws throughout the world should be 
harmonized to allow for the creation of a centralized global securities 
regulator with monitoring, regulatory, and enforcement powers.  This 
centralized global securities regulator should then set a baseline of 
regulation from which individual nations or regions can choose to 
upwardly depart, if desired.  Such a system of international securities 
regulation will prevent a race-to-the-bottom in international securities 
law and avoid other collective action problems by creating a floor for 
regulation and a centralized actor to enforce this baseline system of 
securities law.17 
The problem is that this is a drastic and unrealistic proposal in the 
short-term because of the nationalistic and protectionist tendencies of 
BUS. REV. 191, 193 (2008) (“The global scale of the current troubles shows that other countries have 
been too lax as well, so that there should be a ratcheting up of securities regulation not only in the 
United States, but worldwide.”). 
 12. Id. 
 13. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW FOUNDATION 2 
(2009), available at http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf (discussing the 
financial crisis that began in 2008). 
 14. But see Catherine Rampell, ‘Great Recession’: A Brief Etymology, N.Y. TIMES ECONOMIX 
(Mar. 11, 2009, 5:39 PM), http://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/11/great-recession-a-brief-
etymology (“Nobody can take credit for coining the term ‘The Great Recession’ . . . . Why?  Because 
the ‘Great Recession of 2008’ is not the first recession to be slapped with the lofty title.  Every recession 
of the last several decades has, at some point or another, received this special designation.”). 
 15. See RICHARD A. POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM: THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT 
INTO DEPRESSION x (2009) (“It is the gravity of the economic downturn, the radicalism of the 
government’s responses, and the pervading sense of crisis that mark what the economy is going through 
as a depression.”). 
 16. See infra Part II.C (discussing the dangers of transitioning to a regulatory competition model 
of international securities regulation). 
 17. See infra Part III (discussing the benefits of an approach based on harmonization and 
centralization in international securities law, including that such an approach helps to stabilize the 
emerging global securities markets, benefits market participants, and assists the United States in 
maintaining a dominant role as a securities regulator). 
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many securities regulators.18  Although the emerging global capital 
markets have begun to fuel the convergence of many business norms,19 
the world does not seem ready for a centralized global securities 
regulator with robust monitoring, regulatory, and enforcement powers.  
This reality drives some commentators and regulators to simply live in 
the now without hope for obtaining the benefits that harmonization and 
centralization would provide. 
In this Article, I argue that the harmonization and centralization of 
international securities law should and must occur through a slow 
evolutionary process, rather than a rapid revolutionary process, because 
only under these circumstances will a centralized global securities 
regulator be able to emerge.  In other articles, I have discussed the 
opportunity that the financial crisis that began in 2008 presents for 
reforming international securities regulation,20 the necessity for 
comprehensive domestic and international regulatory reform to prevent 
future financial crises,21 the need for harmonization and centralization of 
international securities law,22 the government’s role in the 
harmonization and centralization of international securities regulation,23 
and the need for a centralized global securities regulator.24  This Article 
extends that previous scholarship in three main ways.  First, it advocates 
for long-term planning in the area of international securities regulation, 
rather than simply existing in the now.  Second, it addresses one of the 
most commonly cited barriers to harmonization and centralization, 
which is that the current nationalistic and protectionist tendencies of 
most securities regulators will not allow for harmonization and 
centralization of international securities law.  Third, this Article details a 
 18. See infra Part II.C (discussing the dangers of transitioning to a regulatory competition 
approach to international securities regulation). 
 19. But see George W. Madison & Stewart P. Greene, TIAA–CREF Response to A Blueprint for 
Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 99, 100 
(2007) (“Still, as a result of both historical and cultural influences, other countries may have differing 
standards for disclosure that are either less stringent or based on different assumptions than those found 
in the U.S. markets.  For example, some foreign markets may have different cultural or legal views 
towards insider trading.”). 
 20. See Eric C. Chaffee, A Moment of Opportunity: Reimagining International Securities 
Regulation in the Shadow of Financial Crisis, 15 NEXUS 29 (2010). 
 21. See Eric C. Chaffee, A Panoramic View of the Financial Crisis that Began in 2008: The Need 
for Domestic and International Regulatory Reform, 35 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 22. See Eric C. Chaffee, Finishing the Race to the Bottom: An Argument for Harmonization and 
Centralization of International Securities Law, 40 SETON HALL L. REV. 1581 (2010). 
 23. See Eric C. Chaffee, The Internationalization of Securities Regulation: The United States 
Government’s Role in Regulating the Global Capital Markets, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 187 (2010). 
 24. See Eric C. Chaffee, Evolution, Not Revolution, in International Securities Regulation: A 
Modest Proposal for a Global Securities and Exchange Commission (Jan. 1, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with the author). 
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mechanism for moving toward harmonization and centralization, i.e., a 
long-term approach that allows for international regulation to evolve 
along with the emerging global capital markets. 
The remainder of this Article is structured as follows.  Part II 
discusses the current state of international securities regulation and the 
need for a new approach to international securities law by focusing on 
the globalization of securities markets, the spectrum of approaches to 
international securities law, and the dangers of transitioning to a 
regulatory competition approach to international securities regulation.  
Part III explains the benefits of the harmonization and centralization of 
international securities law, including that such an approach helps 
stabilize the emerging global securities markets, benefits market 
participants, and assists the United States in maintaining a dominant role 
as a securities regulator.  Part IV describes the evolutionary process 
through which the harmonization and centralization of international 
securities can be achieved by providing two case studies of the use of 
such an evolutionary process, providing a comparative analysis of both 
those case studies, and describing possible paths toward a harmonized 
and centralized system of international securities regulation.  This 
Article concludes that harmonization and centralization offers the best 
approach to international securities law, and that the long-term 
evolutionary process toward a harmonized and centralized system must 
be started. 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION 
AND THE NEED FOR A NEW APPROACH 
An evolutionary approach to international securities regulation is 
necessary because securities markets are evolving, transitioning from 
being national or regional in nature to being global.  A new approach to 
international securities law is needed to meet the challenges presented 
by these emerging global securities markets.  In this Part, the reasons for 
the transition to global securities markets, the possible models for 
international securities regulation, and the dangers of adopting a 
regulatory competition approach to international securities law will be 
explored.  Ultimately, international securities law will have to evolve to 
meet the realities of the emerging global securities markets.  With that 
said, the evolution of regulation should be in the direction of 
harmonization and centralization. 
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A. The Emergence of Global Capital Markets 
For much of the twentieth century, the United States was viewed as 
having the world’s premier capital markets and premier system of 
securities regulation.25  From this position of dominance, the United 
States was able to fuel convergence in international securities regulation 
by convincing other nations and regions to adopt securities laws that 
mirrored the securities laws in the United States.26  With the advent of 
the twenty-first century, however, the United States’ dominance has 
waned as global securities markets have emerged because of the rise of 
strong securities markets throughout the world, the evolution of 
securities trading, the evolution of securities exchanges, and concerns 
over aggressive regulation in the United States. 
In the past few decades, global securities markets have begun to 
emerge because of the rise of strong national securities markets 
throughout the world.  For much of the twentieth century, the capital 
markets in the United States were unique in terms of the breadth and 
depth of available capital.27  During the twenty-first century, however, 
the securities markets in the United States have been challenged by 
strong markets in Asia, Europe, and South America.28  The capital 
 25. See Howell E. Jackson, A System of Selective Substitute Compliance, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
105, 119 (2007) (“For much of the twentieth century, the Commission justly considered itself to be the 
world’s premier securities market regulator.  But with the passage of time, the capital markets of many 
other countries have developed and the supervisory capabilities of many jurisdictions have expanded—
often with the assistance of advice from the SEC or the International Organization of Securities 
Commissions.  Today, a number of these jurisdictions provide capital market oversight that is 
substantially equivalent to SEC supervision.”). 
 26. See Roberta S. Karmel, The EU Challenge to the SEC, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1692, 1711 
(2008) (“Since the SEC has served as the gold standard of securities regulation, it is not surprising that 
as the EU has striven to improve and integrate European capital markets, it has looked to U.S. securities 
regulation as a model.  Yet, changing economics, and in particular the migration of many international 
issuers to the London markets, has given the EU more power in influencing the SEC.  The SEC can no 
longer take a unilateralist approach to securities regulation and assume that the U.S. markets will remain 
the premier capital markets.”). 
 27. See Madison & Greene, supra note 19, at 100 (“The SEC performs its task admirably—and 
sets the standard against which all other regulators around the globe are judged. . . . The SEC, with its 
track record and high standards for protecting investors, has historically been a leader in setting 
benchmarks for market regulation.”); Robert G. DeLaMater, Recent Trends in SEC Regulation of 
Foreign Issuers: How the U.S. Regulatory Regime is Affecting the United States’ Historic Position as 
the World’s Principal Capital Market, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 109, 109 (2006) (“Since World War II, 
the United States has been the world’s principal capital market.  This market has been uniquely broad 
and deep, with substantial retail participation by individual investors and small institutions, plentiful 
capital for equity financing and a willingness to hold long-term debt securities, with tenors [sic] of thirty 
years beings common even for corporate issuers.”). 
 28. See DeLaMater, supra note 27, at 117 (“The securities markets outside the United States 
have grown in breadth and depth of their own over the past twenty years and now afford issuers in their 
home countries significant opportunities for financing that did not previously exist.”). 
6
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss2/6
CHAFFEE FINAL FORMAT (PAGINATED) 3/18/2011  1:03:23 PM 
2010] HARMONIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION 593 
 
markets in the European Union have grown in both size and 
sophistication,29 and the markets in Brazil, Russia, India, and China, 
which are often referred to as “BRIC countries,” offer new opportunities 
for investment and raising capital.30 
The rise of strong securities markets has helped fuel an evolution in 
securities trading.  Retail and institutional investors now look globally 
for investment opportunities as a means of portfolio diversification and 
to offset currency fluctuations.31  Moreover, issuers now have the ability 
to raise capital on a global basis and make decisions based on where 
capital can be obtained at the lowest cost.32  Broker–dealers, investment 
advisors, and other market participants continue to adapt to securities 
markets that have begun to transcend national borders.33  The role of 
technology in this process cannot be understated.  The internet and other 
forms of communication make investment opportunities available on a 
global basis, rather than confining their availability to any particular 
nation or region.34 
 29. See infra Part IV.A (discussing the efforts of the European Union to build a common capital 
market among its member states); see also Roberta S. Karmel, The Once and Future New York Stock 
Exchange: The Regulation of Global Exchanges, 1 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 355, 363 (2007) 
(“The European markets have matured to a point where capital can be raised there to meet the needs of 
most companies.  Foreign, and even some U.S. companies, engaging in IPOs or stock exchange listings 
have done so in Europe, rather than in the United States.”). 
 30. See Karmel, supra note 26, at 1711–12 (“The EU is not the only challenge to the SEC, 
however.  The new strong capital markets in Asia and South America, and in particular in the so-called 
BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China), challenge both the EU and the SEC to shape their 
regulatory approaches to foreign issuers and foreign financial institutions so as not to lose their 
competitive places as market regulators.”). 
 31. See Edward F. Greene, Beyond Borders: Time to Tear Down the Barriers to Global 
Investing, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 85, 85–86 (2007) (“Investing in non-U.S. markets is no longer the 
exclusive province of megainstitutions or the ultrawealthy; it is an essential component of prudent 
portfolio diversification for all [U.S.] investors.”). 
 32. See Karmel, supra note 26, at 1711 (“U.S. investors are buying foreign securities in record 
numbers and foreign issuers no longer believe they need to make offerings in the U.S. to raise capital.”). 
 33. See Jackson, supra note 25, at 107 (“[I]ssuers are not the only entities with mobility in 
modern capital markets: investors, exchanges, brokerage houses, and a wide range of professional 
service providers can and do move around the world.”). 
 34. See Greene, supra note 31, at 86 (“The rise of the internet has given investors a new window 
on the world and access to almost limitless information.  A natural outgrowth of this technological 
revolution, coupled with increasing investor sophistication and the need for financial diversification that 
transcends home country borders, is the understandable desire of investors to communicate and effect 
transactions directly with market participants located in other jurisdictions.”); Susan Wolburgh Jenah, 
Commentary on a Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International 
Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 69, 69–70 (2007) (“Globalization is a fact.  Innovative technologies 
are driving faster and more efficient trading, and they do not recognize national borders. . . . The impact 
of these changes is profound and not yet fully realized.”); Madison & Greene, supra note 19, at 99 (“The 
rapid pace of technological advances is bringing us closer to the reality of a seamless global capital 
market.  In such a world, investors would have access to increased liquidity, greater diversification, and 
a wider range of investment options regardless of their location.  Capital would be more efficiently 
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The emergence of global securities markets has also been fueled by 
the evolution of securities exchanges.  In the past two decades, a wave 
of securities exchange demutualization has transformed many exchanges 
into for-profit entities.35  The pressures created by for-profit status have 
caused many exchanges to eschew previous nationalistic and 
protectionist tendencies to explore profit-making opportunities on a 
global basis.36  The wave of securities exchange demutualization has led 
to a wave of securities exchange consolidation.37  On April 4, 2007, the 
merger of the New York Stock Exchange and Euronext gave birth to the 
world’s first transnational stock exchange.38  In the past few years, the 
push for stock exchange consolidation has continued to aid in the 
breaking down of national and regional capital markets and the building 
up of global ones in their place.39 
The United States is also fueling the emergence of global capital 
markets by pursuing aggressive regulation of its securities markets.  
Many issuers, investors, and other market participants have begun 
seeking opportunities in other nations because of the United States’ 
culture of aggressive shareholder litigation and history of aggressive 
enforcement by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).40  In 
addition, the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 200241 (Sarbanes–Oxley) placed 
significant new corporate governance requirements on entities wishing 
to issue securities in the United States, which has limited the number of 
foreign initial public offerings within its borders.42  Aggressive 
allocated throughout the global economy to the benefit of all participants.”). 
 35. See Karmel, supra note 29, at 356 (“Another factor in the inevitable globalization of 
exchanges is that exchanges have demutualized and become public companies.  They need to please 
their shareholders as well as their customers.  Further, in the process of moving from mutual not-for-
profit citadels of capitalism to public companies, national exchanges have lost their exclusivity and their 
mystique.”). 
 36. Id. 
 37. Eric J. Pan, A European Solution to the Regulation of Cross-Border Markets, 2 BROOK. J. 
CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 133, 136 (2007) (“Demutualization and increased competition has led to a wave 
of consolidation by the European exchanges.”). 
 38. See generally Sara M. Saylor, Note, Are Securities Regulators Prepared for a Truly 
Transnational Exchange?, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 685 (2008); Bo Harvey, Note, Exchange Consolidation 
and Models of International Securities Regulation, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 151 (2007). 
 39. See Jenah, supra note 34, at 71 (“This chess game of proposed exchange mergers, capital tie-
ups, and alliances being played out on the global stage bears witness to the truism that capital markets 
are global.”). 
 40. See Karmel, supra note 29, at 356–57 (“[T]he primary reasons why the NYSE has been 
losing listings is that foreign issuers are disenchanted with the U.S. stock market because of the costs of 
compliance with the requirements of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (Sarbanes–Oxley) and because of 
the U.S. culture of shareholder litigation.”). 
 41. See Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 7201–7266 (2006)). 
 42. See DeLaMater, supra note 27, at 118 (reporting on the limited number of initial public 
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regulation in the United States has helped speed the emergence of global 
capital markets.  Even if the United States weakened the regulation of its 
securities markets, however, the emergence of global capital markets 
seems impossible to stop. 
B. The Spectrum of Approaches to International Securities Law 
The emergence of global capital markets offers the opportunity to re-
imagine international securities regulation.  Although the world has 
started drifting toward a regulatory competition model of international 
securities law, this does not mean that it is the ideal system of 
regulation.  In this Part, six possible models for international securities 
regulation will be explored.  These six approaches are privatization, 
regulatory competition, regulatory convergence, mutual recognition, 
regulatory harmonization, and regulatory centralization.  These six 
approaches to international securities law can be placed on a spectrum 
based on the amount of international cooperation and coordination 
required to bring each of them into being.  Privatization would be at one 
end of the spectrum because it requires the least international 
cooperation and coordination, and centralization would be at the other 
end of the spectrum because it requires the most.  In traveling from 
privatization to centralization on the spectrum, one would pass through 
regulatory competition, convergence, mutual recognition, and 
harmonization.  Obviously, these approaches can overlap and blur. 
Under a privatization approach to international securities regulation, 
private actors would be responsible for regulating the emerging global 
capital markets.  In most models of privatization, securities exchanges 
are the private actors that are responsible for both regulation and 
enforcement.  Although this model might seem to be a radical approach 
to securities regulation, the United States actually employed this 
approach domestically prior to the adoption of state securities laws, i.e. 
the so-called blue sky laws, in the 1910s and 1920s.43  Although a 
privatization approach to international securities regulation could have 
some benefits, this type of approach is unlikely to emerge on the 
offerings from Europe and Asia after the adoption of Sarbanes–Oxley).  But see Jackson, supra note 25, 
at 108 (“Although many have pointed to the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 as damaging 
the ability of U.S. exchanges to compete for foreign cross-listings, there is ample evidence that the 
erosion of U.S. market power for foreign listings was already underway well before 2002.”). 
 43. See Howell E. Jackson, Centralization, Competition, and Privatization in Financial 
Regulation, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 649, 661 (2001) (explaining that “the full privatization of 
securities regulation, would, in the United States, turn back the clock nearly a full century, not just 
before the New Deal, but further back, before the dawning of the first Blue Sky laws of the early 
1900s”). 
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international level.  Most securities regulators, issuers, investors, and 
other market participants have become comfortable with securities 
regulation by governmental entities, which means that the privatization 
of international securities regulation is likely infeasible. 
Regulatory competition constitutes a second approach to international 
securities regulation.  Under a regulatory competition approach, 
individual nations or regions adopt systems of securities regulation and 
then compete to attract issuers, investors, and other market participants.  
The world is currently transitioning to a regulatory competition 
approach to international securities law.  As explained in the next Part, a 
regulatory competition approach is not the best model to regulate the 
emerging global capital markets because patchwork regulation creates a 
race-to-the-bottom in terms of international securities law, produces 
various regulatory and enforcement gaps, and generates various 
collective action problems.44 
Regulatory convergence offers a third approach to international 
securities regulation.  Convergence can be divided into weak and strong 
forms.  Under a weak regulatory convergence approach, nations 
gravitate toward similar systems of securities regulation.  If a dominant 
actor exists and that actor is willing to invest adequate resources into the 
development of its system of securities law, a race-to-the-top may occur.  
If a dominant actor does not exist, nations will compete, and a regulatory 
competition model will emerge.  As previously explained, this will 
generate a race-to-the-bottom, although quality regulation may still be 
adopted in certain discrete instances.45  For much of the twentieth 
century, the United States was able to fuel convergence of the world’s 
securities laws because the United States was viewed as having the 
world’s premier capital markets and premier system of securities 
regulation.46  The United States is still trying to fuel convergence 
through various efforts, including the SEC’s International Technical 
Assistance Program.47  However, the dominance of the United States is 
waning as global capital markets emerge.48  Thus, the United States no 
 44. See infra Part II.C (explaining the dangers of transitioning to a regulatory competition 
approach to international securities regulation). 
 45. See Jenah, supra note 34, at 77 (“The challenge . . . is to strike the right balance between a 
healthy degree of regulatory competition and proverbial ‘race to the bottom.’”). 
 46. See supra notes 25–26 and accompanying text. 
 47. U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Securities and Exchange Commission’s International Technical 
Assistance Program, http://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_emergtech.shtml (last visited June 22, 
2010) (“Utilizing a faculty of senior SEC and industry officials, and seasoned practitioners, the technical 
assistance program provides training to nearly 2000 regulatory and law enforcement officials from over 
100 countries.”). 
 48. See Greene, supra note 31, at 85 (“There can be no argument that the securities markets are 
10
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss2/6
CHAFFEE FINAL FORMAT (PAGINATED) 3/18/2011  1:03:23 PM 
2010] HARMONIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION 597 
 
longer has the same ability to fuel convergence. 
Under a strong regulatory competition approach to international 
securities regulation, nations agree to certain regulatory norms via treaty 
or other agreements.  The signatories then adopt systems of securities 
regulation that codify these norms.  Although this type of approach can 
create a relatively consistent level of regulation, the actual codification 
of the norms can vary greatly.  In addition, this approach also leaves 
regulatory and enforcement gaps between nations.  The effectiveness of 
this approach to transnational securities regulation remains open to 
question because of the variation in regulation that it generates and the 
potential for lack of consistent enforcement.49 
Regulatory mutual recognition offers a fourth approach to 
international securities regulation.  Under a mutual recognition 
approach, nations enter into treaties or other agreements under which 
compliance with one signatory’s securities laws is viewed as compliance 
with all signatories securities laws.  The United States has flirted with a 
mutual recognition approach to international securities regulation.  In 
2007, Ethiopis Tafara and Robert Peterson, two staff members in the 
SEC’s Office of International Affairs, published A Blueprint for Cross-
Border Access to U.S. Investors: A New International Framework in the 
Harvard International Law Journal.50  Tafara and Peterson proposed a 
framework to allow foreign financial service providers, i.e., foreign 
exchanges and foreign broker–dealers, access to the United States 
without having to register with the SEC, although they would remain 
subject to the anti-fraud provisions of United States securities law.51  
The proposed framework was based upon a system of substitute 
compliance under which exemption from registration would be 
permitted only when the financial service provider’s home country’s 
securities laws and enforcement policies were comparable to those in 
other participating nations.  The proposed framework was warmly 
received by the SEC under the leadership of Chairman Cox, and various 
meetings were held to determine how the proposal might be 
now global and that the dominance of the United States as the leading player in the global marketplace is 
being challenged.”). 
 49. See Jackson, supra note 25, at 115 (“[C]ountries with quite similar regulatory systems may 
expend very different amounts of resources on supervisory oversight.”). 
 50. Ethiopis Tafara & Robert J. Peterson, A Blueprint for Cross-Border Access to U.S. Investors: 
A New International Framework, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 31 (2007). 
 51. Id. at 32 (“This Article proposes a new framework to apply to foreign financial service 
providers accessing the U.S. capital market. . . . Rather than requiring such foreign stock exchanges and 
foreign broker–dealers to register with the SEC, as is currently the case, the proposed framework relies 
on a system of substituted compliance with SEC regulations.”). 
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implemented.52  Since the confirmation of Chairman Schapiro at the 
beginning of 2009, however, enthusiasm for the proposal has cooled, 
and the proposal appears to have been tabled.53 
Regulatory harmonization offers a fifth approach to international 
securities regulation.  Under a regulatory harmonization approach, 
nations agree via treaties or other agreements to adopt identical or 
substantially similar systems of securities regulation.  Regulatory 
harmonization can be used either to set a minimum level of regulation or 
to set forth a comprehensive system of securities regulation.  The 
European Union has used a regulatory harmonization approach to 
attempt to create a consistent system of securities regulation in its 
member states.54  European Union directives are enacted that require 
member states to create regulation to achieve a particular result without 
mandating the mechanism for achieving that result.55  Although 
regulatory harmonization is similar to strong regulatory convergence, 
harmonization is different because it does not give nations as great of an 
opportunity to experiment with how to achieve regulatory goals.  The 
ability to experiment is curtailed because harmonization requires 
systems of securities regulation be identical or at least substantially 
similar. 
Regulatory centralization provides a final approach to international 
securities law.  Under a regulatory centralization approach, a centralized 
regulator is created with monitoring, enforcement, and regulatory 
powers.  The United States used this approach domestically in the wake 
of the stock market crash of 1929 when it enacted the Securities Act of 
1933,56 enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,57 and created the 
SEC.  This approach provided relative stability to the capital markets in 
the United States for the remainder of the twentieth century.  An 
economic calamity similar to the Great Depression occurred only when 
 52. See Karmel, supra note 26, at 1708–09 (“Following the publication of the Tafara article and 
favorable comments upon it, the SEC held a Roundtable on Mutual Recognition. . . . Mutual recognition 
of foreign markets and broker–dealers was also promoted in speeches by the Director of the Division of 
Market Regulation.”); Pan, supra note 3, at 223 (“Since the publication of this proposal [by Tafara and 
Peterson], SEC Chairman Christopher Cox and other senior SEC officials have openly discussed and 
endorsed the merits of mutual recognition, and the SEC has held public meetings to discuss how such a 
proposal should be implemented.”). 
 53. See Dan Jamieson, Schapiro Cool to ‘Mutual Recognition’ Efforts, INVESTMENTNEWS (Feb. 
1, 2009), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20090201/REG/302019997 (“Bold efforts by the 
Bush administration Securities and Exchange Commission to open the doors to foreign brokerage firms 
are likely to be put on hold by new Chairman Mary Schapiro.”). 
 54. See generally RALPH H. FOLSOM, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW (2d ed. 2009). 
 55. Id. 
 56. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006). 
 57. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006). 
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regulatory fragmentation and competition emerged on the international 
level as the result of globalization of capital markets. 
C. The Dangers of Transitioning to a Regulatory Competition Model in 
International Securities Regulation 
Regulatory competition is often touted as helping to produce an 
optimal level of regulation because innovation occurs as a result of the 
tensions that exist among regulators to produce an optimal level of 
regulation.  In some areas, regulatory competition is especially useful 
because the parties being regulated do not have the lobbying power to 
pressure regulators to work toward a more efficient regulatory system.  
For example, in the area of criminal law, no politician ever runs on a 
pro-crime platform, so penalties tend to increase unless some state or the 
federal government experiments and finds a lower level of punishment 
has greater benefits.  In the context of securities regulation, however, 
issuers and investors put pressure upon regulators to innovate and 
provide an optimal level of regulation, and therefore, regulatory 
competition is less necessary, although it still may provide some 
benefits.  In the context of international securities regulation, even if a 
regulatory competition approach might provide some benefits, these 
benefits are offset by the fact that regulatory fragmentation of securities 
law produces a race-to-the-bottom, regulatory and enforcement gaps, 
and collective action problems.  Of course, even in a harmonized and 
centralized system, most of the benefits regulatory competition can still 
be maintained if the centralized regulator simply sets a basic level of 
regulation from which individual nations can upwardly depart, if they 
desire. 
A regulatory competition approach to international securities 
regulation produces a race-to-the-bottom in international securities law.  
Although a myriad of causes exist for the financial crisis that began in 
2008, one of the central causes was the under-regulation of the 
mortgage-backed securities that were held by a variety of financial 
institutions at the time the crisis began.  Regulators in the United States 
did not want to ratchet up the level of regulation on the mortgage-backed 
securities fearing that it would add to the waning dominance of the 
United States’ capital markets.58  Regulators in other nations did not 
want to ratchet up the level of regulation on the mortgage-backed 
securities fearing that it would disadvantage their particular nation’s 
ability to participate in the economic prosperity of the early years of the 
 58. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text (explaining the race-to-the-bottom in 
international securities regulation that helped give birth to the financial crisis that began in 2008). 
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millennium.59 
The Obama Administration has admitted that the financial crisis that 
began in 2008 was partially the result of a race-to-the-bottom in 
international financial regulation.  In June 2009, the United States 
Department of the Treasury issued its white paper report on the financial 
crisis, Financial Regulatory Reform: A New Foundation (the Report).60  
The drafters of the Report state the following about the evils of 
regulatory fragmentation: 
 As we have witnessed during this crisis, financial stress can spread 
easily and quickly across national boundaries.  Yet, regulation is still set 
largely in a national context.  Without consistent supervision and 
regulation, financial institutions will tend to move their activities to 
jurisdictions with looser standards, creating a race to the bottom and 
intensifying systemic risk for the entire global financial system.61 
Although the Obama Administration acknowledged the dangers of 
fragmented financial regulation in the Report, it failed to include a 
recommendation for the harmonization and centralization of 
international securities law.62  As a result, a race-to-the-bottom in 
international securities law will continue to exist until harmonization 
and centralization occurs. 
A regulatory competition approach to international securities law also 
produces regulatory and enforcement gaps because of the patchwork of 
regulation that it creates.  Although some gaps can be filled by 
international agreements and extraterritorial application of securities 
laws, patchwork regulation still leaves barriers to the development of a 
seamless global system of regulation.  In addition, even if all nations 
adopt similar systems of securities regulation, this does not ensure a 
consistent level of enforcement.  Regulatory and enforcement gaps can 
be filled only by the creation of a harmonized and centralized system of 
securities law to provide consistent monitoring, regulation, and 
enforcement. 
A regulatory competition approach to international securities 
regulation also creates various collective action problems.  Any 
 59. See infra notes 60–61 and accompanying text (detailing the Obama Administration’s 
acknowledgement that the financial crisis that began in 2008 was partially the result of a race-to-the-
bottom in international securities regulation). 
 60. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, supra note 13. 
 61. See id. at 80 (discussing the need to raise international regulatory standards and improve 
international cooperation in response to the financial crisis that began in 2008). 
 62. See id. at 80–88 (explaining the Obama Administration’s proposals for raising international 
regulatory standards and improving international cooperation in response to the financial crisis in 2008, 
which does not include a proposal for the harmonization and centralization of international securities 
law). 
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fragmented system of regulation creates free rider problems in which 
some actors will fail to invest in adequate levels of regulation and 
enforcement based on the belief that other actors will address any issues 
that arise.  In addition, regulatory fragmentation can also create a 
bystander effect in which various actors witnessing the same issue fail to 
act because of the belief that other actors will address the issue.  A 
harmonized and centralized system approach to international securities 
law remedies these and other collective action problems by creating a 
centralized salient entity to be a driving force in monitoring, regulation, 
and enforcement. 
III. THE BENEFITS OF THE HARMONIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW 
Ideally, the world should adopt a system of international securities 
law based on harmonization and centralization.  Nations throughout the 
world should harmonize their systems of securities law to allow for the 
existence of a centralized global securities regulator, and then these 
nations should negotiate treaties or other agreements to bring such a 
regulator into being.  The centralized global securities regulator should 
have robust monitoring, regulatory, and enforcement powers allowing it 
to replace the current patchwork of regulation.  The centralized global 
securities regulator should set a baseline of regulation from which 
nations could choose to upwardly depart. 
Although such an approach might seem drastic and unrealistic 
because of the current nationalistic and protectionist attitudes of most 
countries, harmonization and centralization offers the best approach to 
international securities law because it minimizes systemic risk in the 
emerging global capital markets, benefits market participants, and 
allows the United States to retain a central role in international securities 
regulation.  With that said, the emergence of harmonization and 
centralization in international securities law is likely to be a long-term 
evolutionary process, rather than a short-term revolutionary process, 
because a significant amount of time will be required to allow the 
current nationalistic and protectionist attitudes of most countries to 
dissipate. 
A. Harmonization and Centralization Minimizes Systemic Risk in the 
Emerging Global Capital Markets 
The emerging global capital markets allow capital to flow throughout 
the world more efficiently, which creates a plethora of opportunities for 
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issuers, investors, and other market participants.63  As evidenced by the 
financial crisis that began in 2008, however, the emergence of global 
capital markets creates new risks because any future financial crisis is 
likely to be global.64  The harmonization and centralization of 
international securities law offers the best method for minimizing the 
new global risks created by the emerging global capital markets.  This is 
because harmonization and centralization ends the international race-to-
the-bottom in securities regulation, eliminates regulatory and 
enforcement gaps, and increases investor confidence. 
Harmonization and centralization of international securities law 
would end the race-to-the-bottom that has emerged as the world has 
begun to transition to a regulatory competition approach to international 
securities regulation.  As previously explained, one of the major causes 
of the financial crisis that began in 2008 was that no nation wanted to 
ratchet up the level of regulation on the mortgage-backed securities that 
were at the heart of the crisis.  The United States did not want to ratchet 
up the level of regulation fearing that it would hurt economic growth in 
the United States and that it would lead to a loss of dominance in terms 
of its capital markets.  Other nations did not want to ratchet up the level 
of regulation on mortgage-backed securities fearing that it would 
disadvantage their nation or region from reaping the benefits of the 
mortgage-backed securities.  Under a model based on harmonization and 
centralization of international securities law, this race-to-the-bottom 
would be prevented.  Securities regulators would no longer opt for 
suboptimal levels of regulation in hopes of attracting issuers, investors, 
and other market participants to their particular nation or region because 
a centralized global regulator would exist to set a consistent level of 
regulation. 
Harmonization and centralization of international securities law also 
helps minimize the global systemic risk created by the emerging global 
capital markets because they eliminate the regulatory and enforcement 
gaps created by the current patchwork of national regulation.  In the 
previous Part, six possible approaches to international securities law 
were discussed.65  In the approaches based solely on privatization, 
 63. See Madison & Greene, supra note 19, at 99 (“The rapid pace of technological advances is 
bringing us closer to the reality of a seamless global capital market.  In such a world, investors would 
have access to increased liquidity, greater diversification, and a wider range of investment options 
regardless of their location.  Capital would be more efficiently allocated throughout the global economy 
to the benefit of all participants.”). 
 64. See Roberta S. Karmel, The Case for a European Securities Commission, 38 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 9, 33 (1999) (“Stock market crashes and financial firm failures have become 
international, just like trading markets.”). 
 65. See supra Part II.B (discussing six possible models for international securities law, including 
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competition, convergence, mutual recognition, and harmonization, 
regulation remains fragmented between securities regulators, which 
allows for regulatory and enforcement gaps.66  These regulatory and 
enforcement gaps are not only created by territoriality issues but also 
from various collective action problems that occur in the absence of a 
dominant actor.  For example, each of these five approaches generates 
free rider problems in which nations are likely to attempt to be free 
riders, rather than investing the time and resources to work for an 
optimal level of international regulation and enforcement.67  Moreover, 
without a dominant actor, each of these five approaches permits a 
bystander effect in which nations witnessing international regulatory and 
enforcement issues assume that other nations will address the problem.68  
When harmonization is coupled with centralization, however, the 
regulatory and enforcement gaps vanish because regulation is no longer 
fragmented.  Hence, under a harmonization and centralization model, the 
emerging global capital markets and the newly-created transnational 
exchanges can be consistently and completely regulated. 
A harmonization and centralization model of international securities 
law also helps minimize the global systemic risk created by the 
emerging global securities markets because it increases investor 
confidence.  Securities markets are largely confidence driven.69  Major 
fluctuations in investor confidence can lead to bubbles or depressions.70  
A relatively high and stable level of investor confidence is optimal 
because it motivates investors to invest and motivates investors to hold 
their investments.71 
privatization, competition, convergence, mutual recognition, harmonization, and centralization). 
 66. See also Karmel, supra note 64, at 39 (“In globalized capital markets, many violations of 
securities laws are transnational.  This means that unless national laws are given extraterritorial effect, 
there will be inadequate law enforcement, but if laws are applied extraterritorially, there will be conflict 
between regulators and confusion on the part of regulated persons as to what are the proper rules.”). 
 67. See Langevoort, supra note 11, at 204 (“When trading is heavily fragmented, no nation is 
able to capture enough of the benefits from investments in quality regulation.  It is a classic free rider 
problem.”). 
 68. See Tal Z. Zarsky, Thinking Outside the Box: Considering Transparency, Anonymity, and 
Pseudonymity as Overall Solutions to the Problems of Information Privacy in the Internet Society, 58 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 991, 1008 (2004) (describing the “bystander effect” as a phenomenon in which entities 
“do not rush to assist others in danger or need, especially when there is no clear indication that it is their 
duty to do so”). 
 69. See Paul D. Cohen, Securities Trading Via the Internet, 4 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 11 
(1999) (“Securities markets play a significant role in the economic life of the U.S. and the world.  The 
growing importance of the securities markets is a direct result of investor confidence in those markets.”). 
 70. See generally Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of 
Securities Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 393, 419 (2006) (providing an analysis of the role of 
confidence and trust in the creation of bubbles and recessions). 
 71. See id. at 419 (explaining that the concept of “investor confidence . . . captures a deeper 
insight that a functioning market depends on investor trust in the integrity of that market and its 
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Patchwork regulation does not create a relatively high and stable level 
of investor confidence.  Most investors will choose not to invest or will 
choose to sell investments quickly if they believe that: (1) they have 
inadequate information; (2) they are going to be the victim of fraud; or 
(3) they are going to lose their investment based on unforeseen market 
fluctuations.72  Patchwork regulation promotes all of these beliefs.  First, 
patchwork regulation encourages the belief among investors that they 
have inadequate information because it adds information gathering costs 
and makes understanding the regulatory environment more difficult.73  
Second, patchwork regulation encourages the belief among investors 
that they are going to be the victim of fraud or other abuse because 
patchwork regulation allows for regulatory and enforcement gaps 
between nations.74  It also allows issuers and broker-dealers to choose 
regulatory regimes that are most favorable to themselves, rather than 
investors.75  Third, patchwork regulation encourages the belief among 
investors that they are going to lose their investment based on 
unforeseen market fluctuations because no centralized, salient entity 
exists to monitor the entire global capital market and take action, if 
needed.76  A model of international securities law based on 
institutions”). 
 72. See id. (“If investors fear being defrauded by issuers, broker dealers, exchanges or other 
market intermediaries, or that the investment odds are otherwise rigged, they will no longer invest in the 
stock market.”); Elizabeth A. Nowicki, A Response to Professor John Coffee: Analyst Liability Under 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 1305, 1312 (2004) (“Investor 
confidence is, in part, built on assurances of honesty and full disclosure.  If investors believe that the 
information incorporated into the prices of stocks in the market is suspect, and if investors believe that 
stock prices are based on biased, inaccurate information, who will continue to invest in the market?”). 
 73. See Tafara & Peterson, supra note 50, at 48 (“[W]hile current U.S. laws and securities 
regulations do not directly limit U.S. investor access to foreign investment opportunities, in practice, 
access is constrained by . . . [a] lack of information about foreign investment opportunities because 
foreign financial service providers (and issuers) are not able to directly solicit American retail investors 
and U.S.-registered broker–dealers are unable to offer American investors information about or research 
on foreign investment products unless investors directly (and specifically) request such information.”). 
 74. See id. at 32 (“As foreign markets develop and adopt higher regulatory standards, U.S. 
investors predictably are looking at them as potential investment opportunities.  However, the current 
international environment has enforcement and oversight gaps that present risks that do not exist in a 
domestic context.”). 
 75. See Pan, supra note 3, at 235 (“A . . . concern is that any difference in regulatory standards 
between the United States and the foreign jurisdiction will give rise to regulatory arbitrage.  Less 
rigorous foreign regulation will favor foreign exchanges and broker–dealers over U.S. exchanges and 
broker–dealers and encourage U.S. market participants to establish operations abroad to take advantage 
of the regulatory differences.”). 
 76. See Tafara & Peterson, supra note 50, at 42 (“For the past seventy two years, investors (both 
American and foreign) have expected U.S. capital markets to be overseen by a regulator with strong 
enforcement powers and be subject to corporate disclosure requirements based on a robust, high-quality, 
comprehensive set of accounting standards. . . . This is not always the case abroad, particularly in 
markets lacking adequate liquidity, where the public float of most traded companies is small, or where 
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harmonization and centralization offers the best solution to stabilizing 
the emerging global securities markets and minimizing the systemic risk 
created by those markets because it would promote investor confidence 
by creating a cohesive system of regulation that would be monitored and 
enforced by a centralized, salient entity. 
B. Harmonization and Centralization Benefits Market Participants 
Beyond helping minimize the systemic risk created by the emerging 
global securities markets, a model of international securities law based 
on harmonization and centralization would also help benefit market 
participants in a variety of other ways.  Such a model would create a 
cohesive system of international securities law that would replace the 
current patchwork of international securities regulation.77  This cohesive 
system of international securities law would help market participants by 
reducing transaction costs, increasing market efficiency, and reducing 
the spillover risk of localized market failures. 
Harmonization and centralization of international securities law 
would help reduce transaction costs for exchanges, investors, broker–
dealers, issuers, and market regulators.  In regard to securities 
exchanges, the completion of the merger between the New York Stock 
Exchange and Euronext on April 4, 2007 started a wave of transnational 
securities exchange consolidations.78  Without harmonization and 
centralization, however, costly barriers remain to the full integration of 
these exchanges because the consolidated exchanges remain subject to 
the localized securities laws of the countries in which they operate.79  
Moreover, in the absence of harmonization and centralization, issuers 
face added transaction costs to obtain the benefit of cross-border 
financing because they must adhere to the laws of each jurisdiction in 
which they choose to sell securities.80  Similarly, broker–dealers, who 
laws against market manipulation are poorly enforced.”). 
 77. See supra Part II.B (discussing six possible models for international securities regulation). 
 78. See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text (discussing the merger between the New York 
Stock Exchange and Euronext and the wave of transnational securities exchange consolidations that 
occurred after the merger was completed). 
 79. See Greene, supra note 31, at 97 (“The SEC must acknowledge that the securities markets 
have evolved beyond jurisdictional borders and that its current regulatory regime has resulted in barriers 
to competition and placed roadblocks in the way of investor access to cross-border investment 
opportunities that have contributed to increased cost and market inefficiencies.”); Pan, supra note 37, at 
137 (“The utmost economic benefits of the [New York Stock Exchange and Euronext] merger will be 
realized only if the exchanges are able to consolidate trading into one platform with a single order book, 
thereby achieving economies of scale and maximizing liquidity.”). 
 80. See Jackson, supra note 25, at 118 (“To date, most economic research on globalization of 
capital markets has explored the benefits of cross-border financings to issuers.  Hence, a common 
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choose to operate in multiple jurisdictions, also face the added expense 
of complying with the securities laws of each of these jurisdictions.81  
These added expenses of issuers and broker–dealers are of course passed 
along to investors.82  Investors also face the added burden of gathering 
and interpreting information in a fragmented regulatory regime,83 and 
investors must pay the expense of complying with a patchwork of 
regulation when they choose to sell their securities.84  Moreover, 
securities regulators shoulder the added expense of operating in a 
fragmented regulatory regime that creates a multitude of issues with 
effective monitoring, regulation, and enforcement.  Harmonization and 
centralization would eliminate many of these costs by creating a 
cohesive and understandable system of international securities 
regulation. 
Under a model of international securities law based on harmonization 
and centralization, market participants also benefit from the increased 
efficiency of the emerging global capital markets.  Such a model 
increases market liquidity, which deepens the pool of capital available to 
issuers and reduces the cost of obtaining that capital.85  Transactions 
between issuers and investors can be quickly and easily completed, and 
a seamless global capital market could emerge.86 
Finally, a model of international securities regulation based on 
harmonization and centralization also benefits market participants 
because it reduces the potential spillover risk of localized market failures 
measure of the benefits of globalization is the reduction in the cost of capital for issuers.”). 
 81. See also Greene, supra note 31, at 86 (“The current U.S. regulatory scheme makes cross-
border investment costly and inefficient.”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. See also Jackson, supra note 25, at 111 (“Aside from technical barriers, U.S. retail investors 
face serious problems receiving information about foreign investment opportunities.  Most notably, 
foreign broker dealers are prohibited from soliciting most U.S. retail investors unless those firms comply 
with SEC registration and compliance requirements.”). 
 84. See also Tafara & Peterson, supra note 50, at 48 (“[O]ver the past two years, U.S. retail 
investment abroad has surged dramatically, mostly as a result of investors seeking higher overseas 
returns made possible by the devaluation of the U.S. dollar.  However, the process can be cumbersome 
and comparatively expensive.”). 
 85. See Greene, supra note 31, at 88 (“Issuers, both within and outside the United States, will 
gain access to a wider pool of investors and benefit from a reduced cost of capital.”).  But see Jackson, 
supra note 25, at 118 (“While lower capital costs presumably benefit consumers through higher 
economic growth, the benefits are not entirely obvious to the consumers in countries like the United 
States where foreign issuers come to raise their capital.  Indeed, foreign issuers could end up competing 
with domestic firms for scarce domestic capital and forcing local firms to pay more for their capital.”). 
 86. See Greene, supra note 31, at 88 (“Breaking down the barriers between U.S. financial 
markets and comparably regulated non-U.S. financial markets will benefit both U.S. and non-U.S. 
market participants.  U.S. investors will benefit from more efficient execution of transactions in non-
U.S. securities.  Non-U.S. investors will similarly benefit from more efficient execution of transactions 
in U.S. securities.”). 
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or other financial crises.  As previously discussed, the capital markets 
are now global.  As the world becomes increasingly interconnected, any 
future financial crisis is likely to be global as well.87  This also means 
that localized market failures or other financial crises can easily 
spillover and have global consequences.88  The creation of a centralized 
global securities regulator reduces this risk because such a regulator 
would provide additional monitoring of the world’s financial markets 
and would have the power to act globally to prevent or reduce the 
impact of any localized market failure or other financial crisis. 
C. Harmonization and Centralization Allows the United States to 
Maintain a Central Role in International Securities Regulation 
An additional benefit of a model of international securities law based 
on harmonization and centralization is that it would allow the United 
States to maintain a central role in international securities regulation.  Of 
course, allowing the United States to maintain a central role in 
international securities regulation benefits the United States because it 
would give the United States power in a harmonized and centralized 
system of international securities law, instead of allowing its influence 
to continue to dwindle under the emerging international system of 
regulatory competition.  Allowing the United States to play a central role 
in international securities regulation also benefits the rest of the world 
because it gives the world the benefit of the United States’ experience as 
a securities regulator and allows the United States to export its theories 
of market regulation.  Hence, the current patchwork of inconsistent 
international securities regulation would be replaced with a system of 
cohesive regulation with similarities to the system of regulation that kept 
the capital markets in the United States relatively stable for much of the 
twentieth century. 
A model based on harmonization and centralization would allow the 
United States to shape the global markets based on its experience as a 
securities regulator.  For much of the twentieth century, the United 
States was viewed as having the world’s premier capital markets and the 
world’s premier system of securities regulation.  During the twentieth 
century, the United States transitioned from a system of regulatory 
competition among state regulators to a system of centralized regulation 
 87. See Jackson, supra note 25, at 112 (“An interesting challenge in the regulation of foreign 
investments is the possibility of spillover effects in the United States when things go wrong overseas, 
like the Parmalat scandal or the Asian financial crisis of 1997.”). 
 88. Id. 
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with the enactment of the Securities Act of 193389 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.90  This transition resulted from the stock market 
crash of 1929 and the Great Depression.91  The financial downturn that 
began in 2008, which arguably should be characterized as a depression, 
came into being in part because of the globalization of financial markets 
and the development of a patchwork of regulation on the international 
level.  A harmonized and centralized model of international securities 
regulation would provide a similar solution to the regulation of the 
emerging global capital markets as the approach that worked to keep the 
securities markets relatively stable in the United States for much of the 
twentieth century.  In structuring this harmonized and centralized 
system, the world would gain the benefit of the United States’ 
experience during the twentieth century. 
A harmonized and centralized system of international securities 
regulation would permit the United States to export its theories of 
market regulation as it negotiated with other securities regulators 
throughout the world to allow for the existence of a centralized global 
securities regulator.  The United States would be able to play a leading 
role in international securities law by allowing its voice to be heard in 
this process.  Although the United States was able to fuel weak 
regulatory convergence in international securities regulation during 
much of the twentieth century because of having the world’s premier 
capital markets and premier system of securities regulation, the United 
States’ dominance is now waning.  Its best hope to maintain a leading 
role in international securities regulation is to advocate for 
harmonization and centralization.  Ultimately, playing a role in this 
process will benefit the rest of the world because harmonization and 
centralization based on the market regulation theories used by the United 
States during much of the twentieth century offer the best hope for 
minimizing the systemic risk in the emerging global securities markets. 
IV. AN EVOLUTIONARY MODEL FOR THE HARMONIZATION AND 
CENTRALIZATION OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAW 
Although a strong argument exists for the harmonization and 
centralization of international securities law, two complaints are 
 89. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006). 
 90. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006). 
 91. See also Eric C. Chaffee, Beyond Blue Chip: Issuer Standing to Seek Injunctive Relief Under 
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Without the Purchase or Sale of Security, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 1135, 
1139 (2006) (discussing Congress’s reasons for passing the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, 
including preventing “national emergencies created by unreasonable fluctuations in security prices”). 
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commonly made against such an approach, which can be rebutted.  First, 
opponents of harmonization and centralization argue that such an 
approach prevents the regulatory innovation that is yielded through 
regulatory competition.  However, the tensions among regulators, 
issuers, and investors create pressures to find an optimal level of 
regulation because each group has the political power to push for either 
regulation or deregulation.  In addition, under the model of 
harmonization and centralization proposed in this Article, regulatory 
competition is not completely prohibited because the centralized global 
regulator would create only a baseline of regulation from which 
individual nations could upwardly depart.  Second, opponents of 
harmonization and centralization and those who simply resign 
themselves to the current system of international securities law argue 
that harmonization and centralization is not feasible because most 
regulators would be unwilling to eschew current nationalistic and 
protectionist tendencies to allow such a system of international securities 
regulation to come into being.  Although harmonization and 
centralization may be a drastic and unrealistic approach in the short-
term, such an approach becomes feasible if it is allowed to emerge 
through a long-term evolutionary process.  In this Part, two case studies 
of long-term evolutionary institution building will be presented; the 
commonalities between these case studies will be discussed; and a 
number of possible paths toward the harmonization and centralization of 
international securities law will be explored. 
A. Two Case Studies Illustrating the Value of an Evolutionary Approach 
to Institution Building 
A long-term evolutionary approach to the development of a 
harmonized and centralized system of international securities regulation 
might seem odd in comparison to the relatively rapid pace at which 
global capital markets have developed.92  However, such an 
evolutionary approach offers the best and perhaps the only way that such 
a system of international securities law might emerge.  Often, the 
building of institutions takes a series of stages and transitions prior to 
the emergence of an effective and lasting body.  The development of 
securities regulation in the United States and the development of 
securities regulation in the European Union offer two case studies 
illustrating the value of an evolutionary approach to institution building. 
The development of securities regulation in the United States reflects 
 92. See supra Part II.A (describing the emergence of global capital markets). 
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an evolutionary process involving a variety of stages and transitions.  
During the 1700s, the 1800s, and the first decade of 1900s, the United 
States did not have codified systems of securities law.  Instead, the 
United States employed a privatization approach to securities regulation 
under which securities exchanges determined rules governing issuers, 
investors, and other market participants.  In addition, general provisions 
of tort and criminal law were used to prohibit fraud in the purchase or 
sale of securities.  This approach to securities regulation proved 
ineffective in preventing fraud, and in 1911, Kansas passed the first state 
statute providing for securities regulation.93  This statute became 
commonly referred to as a blue sky law, along with all other 
subsequently passed state statutes that focus on securities regulation.94  
Throughout the 1910s and 1920s, as the United States took a regulatory 
competition approach to securities law, “blue sky laws” began to appear 
throughout the United States and formed a patchwork of regulation that 
was largely ineffective in preventing securities fraud.95  Although 
federal securities regulation was discussed during this period, it was 
viewed as unrealistic until the stock market crash of 1929.96  In response 
to the stock market crash, Congress adopted a harmonized and 
centralized approach to security law and passed the Securities Act of 
193397 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.98  Notably, § 4(a) of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 created the SEC, a centralized 
administrative agency charged with overseeing the regulation and 
enforcement of securities laws in the United States.99  As a result of this 
harmonized and centralized approach, the markets in the United States 
remained relatively stable until the financial downturn that began in 
2008, which arguably occurred because of regulatory fragmentation on 
 93. 1 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.2[2] (6th ed. 2009) (“[I]n 
1911, Kansas passed the first state securities statutory regulatory scheme.  This, like subsequent 
securities legislation in other states, has come to be known as a ‘blue sky law.’”). 
 94. Id. 
 95. See also Eric C. Chaffee, Standing Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5: The Continued 
Validity of the Forced Seller Exception to the Purchaser–Seller Requirement, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 843, 
851 (2009) (“Prior to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, individual states were the main forces in 
regulating securities.  The state statutes were and are commonly referred to as ‘blue sky laws,’ and prior 
to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, the state statutes created an inconsistent patchwork of 
securities regulation that was largely ineffective in preventing fraud.”). 
 96. See HAZEN, supra note 93, § 1.2[2] (“Following enactment of the early state securities laws, 
federal legislation was successfully resisted for a while.  However, the stock market crash of 1929 is 
properly described as the straw that broke the camel’s back.  The era that followed ushered in federal 
securities regulation.”). 
 97. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006). 
 98. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006). 
 99. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006) (providing for the establishment of the SEC). 
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the international level. 
The development of securities regulation in the European Union 
offers a second example of the value of an evolutionary approach to 
institution building.  Securities regulation in Europe dates back to at 
least the thirteenth century.100  Despite this long history, securities 
regulation and securities markets in Europe remained a national 
phenomenon until the second half of the twentieth century.101  In 1957, 
the Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty) helped 
found the European Communities, which was the predecessor to the 
European Union, and stated that one of its purposes was the “abolition, 
as between Member States, of the obstacles to the free movement of 
persons, services and capital.”102  Despite this mandate, interest in the 
development of transnational securities markets in Europe remained 
limited until the mid-1980s.103  In 1985, the Commission of the 
European Communities issued its white paper report, Completing the 
Internal Market.104  This report led to the Single European Act, which 
amended the EC Treaty to make it easier to pass directives to member 
states requiring them to harmonize their securities laws.105  The 
completion of a transnational securities market did not occur until after 
the Treaty on European Union, also known as the Treaty of Maastricht, 
was signed in 1992.106  In November 1999, the European Commission 
issued an action plan noting several shortcomings of the existing system 
of securities regulation in the European Union.107  In July 2000, based 
on the information contained in the action plan, the European Council 
appointed the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European 
Securities Markets.108  Ultimately, the Committee of Wise Men 
 100. See HAZEN, supra note 93, § 1.2[1] (describing the development of securities regulation in 
England, including that “[r]egulation of securities brokers dates back to the thirteenth century”). 
 101. See DeLaMater, supra note 27, at 110 (explaining that for much of the twentieth century the 
securities markets in Europe were “fragmented, relatively uninterested in equity securities—especially at 
the retail level—and not receptive to long-term debt financing”). 
 102. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community art. 3(c), Mar. 25, 1957, 298 
U.N.T.S. 11. 
 103. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
 104. Comm’n of the European Communities, Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from 
the Commission of the European Council, COM (1985) 310 final (June 14, 1985). 
 105. Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, 25 I.L.M. 503 (1986). 
 106. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 224) 1, 31 I.L.M. 247 (1992). 
 107. Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets: Action Plan, COM (1999) 232 final 
(May 11, 1999). 
 108. See Caroline Bradley, Consumers of Financial Services and Multi-Level Regulation in the 
European Union, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1212 , 1220 (2008) (“The Economic and Financial Affairs 
Council [of the Council of the European Union] . . . appointed a Committee of Wise Men, led by Baron 
Lamfalussy, to rethink the EU’s processes for developing financial policy, and this committee proposed 
a new system which would distinguish framework measures and detailed implementing rules.”). 
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recommended the creation of the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR).109  On July 6, 2001, acting upon this advice, the 
European Commission decided to create CESR to serve as a centralizing 
force in securities regulation in the European Union.110  As outlined on 
its website, CESR’s role was to: 
 
 Improve co-ordination among securities regulators: 
developing effective operational network mechanisms to 
enhance day to day consistent supervision and enforcement of 
the Single Market for financial services . . . 
 
 Act as an advisory group to assist the EU Commission: in 
particular in its preparation of draft implementing measures of 
EU framework directives in the field of securities; 
 
 Work to ensure more consistent and timely day-to-day 
implementation of community legislation in the Member 
States . . .111 
 
As a result of the financial downturn that began in 2008, a successor to 
CESR was proposed.112  CESR was replaced by the European Securities 
and Markets Authority, an entity with more robust regulatory powers, 
which increased the harmonization and centralization of securities 
regulation in the European Union.113 
B. The Common Characteristics of the Two Case Studies 
Although the development and the political climates of the United 
States and the European Union vary dramatically, certain commonalities 
emerge from studying the evolution of their systems of securities 
regulation.  These commonalities include evolution based on political 
 109. Comm. of Wise Men, Final Report of the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of 
European Securities Markets, at 19 (Feb. 15, 2001), available at http://ec.europa.eu/ 
internal_market/securities/docs/lamfalussy/wisemen/final-report-wise-men_en.pdf. 
 110. Commission Decision 2001/527, Establishing the Committee of European Securities 
Regulators, 2001 O.J. (L 191) 43, 44 (EC). 
 111. CESR in Short, http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=cesrinshort&mac=0&id= (last 
visited June 22, 2010). 
 112. Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Establishing a 
European Securities and Markets Authority, COM (2009) 503 final (Sept. 23, 2009). 
 113. Regulation 1095/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 
Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), 2010 O.J. 
(L 331) 84.  See also ESMA, About Us, http://www.esma.europa.eu/ 
index.php?page=cesrinshort&mac=0&id= (last visited Jan. 18, 2011). 
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stress, evolution based on the failure of institutions to achieve their 
intended goals, and a consistent trajectory toward harmonization and 
centralization.  These commonalities suggest a path for international 
securities regulation toward harmonization and centralization that may 
ultimately be a natural progression, although recognition and 
understanding of it may help make the transition to a harmonized and 
centralized system of international securities regulation easier. 
In both the United States and the European Union, securities 
regulation has evolved based on political stress.  The United States 
transitioned from a privatized system of securities regulation to a system 
of regulatory competition based on state law because of fears of fraud 
within the privatized system.114  Then, the United States transitioned 
from a regulatory competition approach to securities regulation to a 
system of centralized regulation based on outcry over the stock market 
crash of 1929 and the Great Depression.115  Similarly, the European 
Union transitioned from a system of regulatory competition among 
member states to a harmonized system of securities regulation based on 
outcry over failing to meet the edicts of the EC Treaty to achieve a 
common market among member states,116 and then transitioned to a 
harmonized and centralized approach with the creation of CESR when 
the creation of a common market continued to be elusive.117  Finally, the 
European Union is moving toward greater centralization with the 
creation of the European Securities and Markets Authority because of 
the financial crisis that began in 2008.118  For both the United States and 
the European Union, political stress was required to reach the next 
evolutionary stage. 
For a harmonized and centralized system of international securities 
regulation to emerge, political stress will need to fuel the process.  For 
this to occur, widespread concern over fraud in the global securities 
markets or a series of financial crises will likely need to occur.  Crisis 
has traditionally created change in securities regulation.  With that said, 
the nationalistic and protectionist tendencies of most securities 
regulators throughout the world are deeply engrained.  For example, 
although the financial crisis that began in 2008 has generated increased 
interests in global entities, such as the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions, it has not fueled a major push toward 
harmonization and centralization on the international level.  A series of 
 114. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. 
 115. See supra notes 96–99 and accompanying text. 
 116. See supra notes 102–106 and accompanying text. 
 117. See supra notes 107–111 and accompanying text. 
 118. See supra notes 112–113 and accompanying text. 
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crises will likely be required for harmonization and centralization to 
become the dominant model of international securities law. 
The evolution of securities regulation in both the United States and 
the European Union also required failure of various institutions to meet 
their intended goals.  In the United States, failure of securities exchanges 
to effectively address fraud in the securities markets caused a transition 
to regulatory competition among the states.  The failure of the states to 
provide stability to the national securities markets led to the 
centralization of securities regulation in the United States through the 
enactment of the Securities Act of 1933,119 the enactment of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,120 and the creation of the SEC.121  The 
story is similar in the European Union.  The failures of the European 
Communities to achieve the edicts of the EC Treaty in part led to the 
creation of the European Union, and the failure of the European Union 
to achieve a common securities market led to the creation of CESR.  
Finally, the failure of CESR to prevent the financial crisis that began in 
2008 has led to a push for greater centralization with the creation of the 
European Securities and Markets Authority. 
The experiences of the United States and the European Union suggest 
that various failures will occur on the path to the harmonization and 
centralization of international securities regulation and that these failures 
are likely a necessary part of the evolutionary process.  To achieve 
harmonization and centralization, the willingness to move slowly across 
the spectrum of approaches to international securities regulation will be 
required. 
Finally, both the experiences of the United States and the European 
Union demonstrate a consistent progression toward the harmonization 
and centralization of securities regulation.  The United States 
transitioned from privatization to regulatory competition to 
centralization, and for most of the twentieth century its capital markets 
remained relatively stable.  The European Union has taken a similar 
trajectory by transitioning from regulatory competition to harmonization 
and centralization of its securities laws.  The United States and the 
European Union are now part of a global patchwork of securities laws, 
and as a result of this patchwork, they are again faced with the dangers 
of regulatory competition.  The United States, the member states of the 
European Union, and the other nations of the world must begin anew the 
slow evolutionary process toward harmonization and centralization. 
 119. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2006). 
 120. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78nn (2006). 
 121. 15 U.S.C. § 78d(a) (2006) (providing for the establishment of the SEC). 
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C. Possible Paths to the Harmonization and Centralization of 
International Securities Law 
A slow evolutionary process offers the best chance that the 
harmonization and centralization of international securities law will 
occur.  The issue that lingers is what the next step should be in the 
process toward such a system of securities law.  In fact, a myriad of 
potential next steps exist.  Any sort of action on the part of securities 
regulators that fuels cooperation and coordination moves the current 
system of international securities law based on regulatory competition 
toward a system based on harmonization and centralization.  Three 
possible options include adopting a mutual recognition approach to 
international securities regulation; developing multinational task forces 
to assist in transnational enforcement of securities laws; and endowing 
the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) with 
more robust monitoring, regulatory, and enforcement powers. 
One potential step toward the harmonization and centralization of 
international securities law is to adopt the mutual recognition model of 
securities regulation that was proposed by Tafara and Peterson.122  As 
previously explained, the proposed framework would allow foreign 
securities exchanges and foreign broker–dealers access to the United 
States without having to register with the SEC.123  The foreign securities 
exchange and foreign broker–dealer would be eligible for exemption 
from registration only if its home country’s securities laws and 
enforcement policies were comparable to those of the other participating 
nations.  Although this proposed framework would not create a 
harmonized and centralized system of international securities law, the 
framework would be a step toward such a system because of the 
increased cooperation and coordination that would be created among 
securities regulators participating in the mutual recognition framework. 
A second potential step toward the harmonization and centralization 
of international law would be to create multinational task forces to assist 
in the transnational enforcement of securities regulation.  Under this 
model, nations would come together to create task forces that would be 
composed of national securities regulators and would work to monitor 
transnational securities issues.  These task forces would be created by 
treaties or other agreements and could be given investigatory power and 
the standing to initiate suit in the event that a securities law violation is 
 122. See supra notes 50–53 and accompanying text (discussing proposal by Tafara and Peterson 
for a mutual recognition framework). 
 123. See supra note 51 and accompanying text (providing an overview of the mutual recognition 
framework proposed by Tafara and Peterson). 
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believed to have occurred.  This model falls short of a harmonized and 
centralized system of international securities regulation because the task 
forces would have to obey and enforce the national securities laws in 
each jurisdiction in which it operated.  However, this type of approach 
could be an important step toward the eventual adoption of a 
harmonized and centralized approach to international a securities law. 
A third potential step toward the harmonization and centralization of 
international law would be to endow the International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) with more robust monitoring, 
regulatory, and enforcement powers.  IOSCO was created in 1983 when 
securities regulators from eleven countries in North and South America 
decided to transform an inter-American association of securities 
regulators into a global body.124  Today, IOSCO is composed of 
regulators from over 100 jurisdictions who regulate more than ninety-
five percent of the world’s securities markets.125  IOSCO serves 
monitoring and coordinating functions, rather than being a centralized 
body for the creation and enforcement of securities law.126  Compliance 
with IOSCO’s efforts is voluntary unless an individual nation chooses to 
adopt them.127  One step toward a harmonized and centralized system of 
international securities law would be to endow IOSCO with more robust 
monitoring, regulatory, and enforcement powers.  IOSCO has the 
potential to be a force in the harmonization and centralization of 
international securities law, but as currently composed, IOSCO has too 
little power to serve this function. 
Ultimately, anything that fuels the process toward harmonization and 
centralization of international securities law is a positive, and no single 
path to such a system of securities law is required.  With that stated, 
however, the world has begun to develop a seamless global capital 
market.  The end of international securities regulation must be to 
 124. See OICV–IOSCO, IOSCO Historical Background,, http://www.iosco.org/about/ 
index.cfm?section=background (last visited Jan. 20, 2011) (“[IOSCO] was created in 1983 with the 
decision to change from an inter-American regional association (created in 1974) into a global 
cooperative body.  Eleven securities regulatory agencies from North and South America took [sic] this 
decision in April 1983 at a meeting in Quito, Ecuador.”). 
 125. Id. (“Its membership regulates more than 95% of the world’s securities markets and it is the 
primary international cooperative forum for securities market regulatory agencies.  IOSCO members are 
drawn from, and regulate, over 100 jurisdictions and its membership continues to grow.”). 
 126. See OICV–IOSCO, About Us, http://www.iosco.org/about (last visited Jan. 20, 2011) 
(providing an overview of IOSCO’s main purposes). 
 127. See, e.g., INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, OBJECTIVES AND PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION (1998), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD82.pdf; INT’L 
ORG. OF SEC. COMM’NS, MULTILATERAL MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING CONCERNING 
CONSULTATION AND COOPERATION AND THE EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION (2002), available at 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD126.pdf. 
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develop a seamless global system of securities law to regulate that 
market. 
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